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Abstract: 
Theories of interdependent preferences predicts that the effect of peer earnings 
on individual well-being is either negative, the “relative deprivation”, or positive 
the “cognitive effect”. The evidence so far has attributed the dominance of each 
of the above effects on the country’s economic and political environment. This 
study claims that relative earnings can affect job satisfaction in two opposite 
ways, through the affective, “relative deprivation”, and the cognitive channel. 
The dominance of each effect depends on the individual-specific financial 
situation rather than the country’s environment. Utilising a longitudinal dataset 
for British employees, the results of this study show that the cognitive 
informational effect of “peer earnings” dominates social comparisons for those in 
financial distress. It further suggests job satisfaction is a relative concept. 
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1.  Introduction 
In recent years there has been notable interest in well-being as a determinant of 
individual economic behaviour. A strand of this literature has focused on job 
satisfaction (Hamermesh, 1977; Freeman, 1978) and has considered it as one of 
the three major determinants of life satisfaction or happiness (Argyle, 1989). The 
importance of job quality and job satisfaction, or happiness at work, for the build 
up of good employee morale has been highlighted by the European Union in host 
of recent guidelines. These are critical elements which affect quits, layoffs and 
firm performance. Bewley (1995) reports that both employers and employees 
recognise the desirability and importance of happiness at work for good 
employment relations.  
Evaluating the socioeconomic determinants of job satisfaction, studies have 
focused on unions (Borjas, 1979), gender (Clark, 1997; Sloane and Williams, 2000; 
Bender et al., 2005), race (Bartel, 1981), occupations (Watson et al., 1996;  Ward 
and Sloane, 2000), industry or establishment characteristics (Cappelli and Sherer, 
1988; Idson, 1990) as well as priority-setting behaviour (Drakopoulos and 
Theodossiou, 1997; Clark, 2001; Skalli, Vasileiou and Theodossiou, 2005). In 
contrast to the standard view, Akerlof, Rose and Yellen (1988) has shown that 
earnings and hours of work are not of sole or even primary importance in 
determining productivity and well being at work. Aspiration level theory 
postulates that the gap between earnings aspirations and earnings achievement is 
a fundamental determinant of well-being. This view is based on the idea that 
people tend to form expectations early in adulthood, which is configured by their 
education and upbringing. These expectations evolve during life, as a result of 
accumulated experience and social interactions. Hence, well-being is reference-
dependent. This implies that wages exhibit both a direct and an indirect effect job 
satisfaction. The direct effect is the effect of the actual level of earnings, related to 
effort and financial needs. The indirect effect depends on the way employees 
evaluate the remuneration of their work relative to some norm or reference. This 
norm or reference is founded on intra-personal and inter-personal comparisons 
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which define the relative position of the individual in the earnings distribution 
(Frank, 1997; Hamermesh, 2001).  
Though the subjective well-being approach offers evidence supporting the 
argument that utility is at least in part relative, it has not yet been made entirely 
clear how income comparisons affect it. For subjective well being and focusing on 
interpersonal comparisons, Runciman, 1966 has shown the importance of  the 
“relative deprivation” theory for both satisfaction with work and satisfaction 
with life. Evidence shows that the income of the reference group creates a 
negative externality. However, this is not the only direction theories of social 
comparisons have pointed at. There have been studies suggesting a positive 
externality. This strand emphasizes the influential informational content that 
social comparisons can have, when the individual’s future is uncertain in an 
environment of economic uncertainty. Hirschman defined this as the “tunnel 
effect” (Hirschman, with Rothschild, 1973), that is a positive indirect influence of 
the income of “relative others” on individual welfare. It operates because 
upward mobility of others supplies information about a high probability of own 
advancement. A second framework justifying positive social comparison effects 
on individual well-being is provided in the context of “Social Capital” theories1. 
Ravallion and Lokshin, 2005 argue that the positive externality springs from an 
“increased security” effect reflecting the help that people can get from friends, 
relatives, neighbours and colleagues when in need.  
The evidence supporting the dominance of one theory over the other is based on 
country-level studies. It is the country-specific economic and political 
environment that supports the creation of norms of comparison. Thus, while the 
pursuit for status has become the norm in developed western societies, 
individuals in underdeveloped or developing countries are thought to have 
different norm formation mechanisms. Hence, although in the West, after years 
of economic growth and development, the ownership of a luxury car or a 
designer-made suit gives rise to feelings of envy to those who are less fortunate 
                                                 
1 Woolcock, 2002; 2005. 
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against the privileged, in economically unstable societies less privileged 
individuals are supposed to be likely to consider the good fortune of their more 
fortunate fellow citizens in a more benevolent fashion, seeing shines of hope in 
the success of those who progress. However, such attitudes are likely to be short - 
lived if their own expectations are not fulfilled. Although the evidence justifies 
the positive cognitive impact of reference norms of earnings/income through its 
informational content, the view that this positive effect is only prevalent in 
underdeveloped/developing countries seems to suggest a rather ascetic lifestyle 
in the Stoic sense in these countries.  
This study provides evidence that the individual-specific circumstances are 
responsible for determining the direction of the effect of social comparisons on 
individual evaluations of well being or job satisfaction rather than the country-
specific environment. In this respect, this study shows the dual nature of social 
comparison effects. Utilizing a panel dataset of British employees it presents 
evidence supporting the influence of (a) an affective and (b) a cognitive - context 
effect of “peer earnings” on job satisfaction.  
According to Veenhoven (1991), the affective component of well-being is the 
hedonic level, i.e. the “degree to which the various affects a person experiences are 
pleasant”. The cognitive component is labeled contentment and is “the degree to 
which an individual perceives his aspirations to be met”. Veenhoven (1991) argues that 
satisfaction with specific aspects of life, such as income satisfaction and job 
satisfaction is more likely to be relative, compared to satisfaction with life as a 
whole, which primarily depends on the hedonic level of affect. Weiss (2002) 
argues that job satisfaction is usually inappropriately defined as affect since this 
obscures differences among three separate constructs, overall evaluative 
judgments about jobs, affective experiences at work and beliefs about jobs. The 
extent to which an employee considers the remuneration of his or her work as 
satisfying compared to the aspired is of primary importance for the evaluation of 
his or her job, in an era where job prestige and the material level of living are 
valued highly.  
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This study sets off from the assumption that job satisfaction is a relative concept 
and the comparison earnings exhibit a permanent negative affective effect. 
However, it claims that transitory shifts in the norm of comparison exhibit a 
positive cognitive effect in the short-run. The magnitude of the latter effect differs 
significantly between the segment of the employed population living in financial 
distress and the segment living in financial comfort. Indeed, assuming that there 
is a permanent as well as a transitory effect of “relative earnings” on job 
satisfaction, the results reveal a negative permanent comparison effect of  the 
“relative earnings” on job satisfaction. Its magnitude is similar for both 
financially vulnerable and financially sound employees. The transitory 
component - arising from changes in reference earnings compared to the 
individual-average - exhibits a significantly positive effect on job satisfaction, 
which is significantly higher for the financially vulnerable group. This implies 
that, among the financially distressed, the informational content of social 
comparisons dominates whereas the “relative deprivation” effect is important for 
the financially secure group. One should note that this effect is found for the 
relatively stable economic environment of Britain. Furthermore, robustness 
checks indicate that the positive cognitive effect is stronger for younger 
employees, for employees earning less than the reference group, and for those 
with uncertain income. Finally, it is more likely that the informational content of 
earnings comparisons drives this positive effect, rather than social capital 
considerations. To the knowledge of the authors, this is the first study that 
indicates a dual effect of peer earnings on job satisfaction within the same 
country-context and relates the two effects to the individual-specific financial 
circumstances.  
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a 
literature review on the aspiration level theory and the empirical evidence on 
reference dependent well-being. Section 3 describes the data, the hypothesis and 
the empirical strategy. The results and their implications are discussed in Section 
4. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Aspiration Norms and the Labour Market: A Review 
In modern societies, income is a direct indicator of socioeconomic status and 
achievement. Thus, not only income from work but also the perception about the 
extent to which income satisfies financial needs exerts a major influence on job 
satisfaction. Aspiration level theory provides a candidate explanation for several 
of the stylized facts in the job satisfaction literature, such as the Anglo-Saxon 
paradox (Frey and Stutzer, 2002), i.e. the opposite gender differences in earnings 
and job satisfaction (Clark, 1997; Bender, et al., 2005), the non-linear U-shaped age 
profile of job satisfaction (Clark, Oswald and Warr, 1996; Levy-Garboua & 
Montmarquette, 1997), the British education paradox (Clark and Oswald, 1996; 
Bender and Heywood, 2005) and the higher job satisfaction among the low-paid 
(Leontaridi and Sloane, 2004). Individual and within-country group differences 
in job satisfaction levels and well being can, in part, be attributed first, to 
differences in earnings aspiration levels formed through education and 
upbringing (Stutzer, 2004), and second, to the way these evolve during the 
working life. In a non-visible form of social action, individuals compare their 
own earnings with a norm determined by some level of expectations (Layard, 
2003). Social norms have been described as “beliefs held by societal members” 
(Akerlof, 1980), “agreements to improve the efficiency of the economic system and 
alleviate market inadequacies” (Arrow, 1971), “invisible handshakes” (Okun, 1980) 
and as “the standard of achievement or comparison, shaped by personal experience and 
social comparisons” (McBride, 2001). In the latter view, the aspiration norm is 
viewed as reference dependent and satisfaction is affected by changes in own 
income and the income of others. This is in line with Duesenberry‘s (1949) view 
regarding the frame of reference which affects utility. McBride (2001) defines the 
process as an “internal norm”, arising from psychological theories of adaptation 
and habit formation. This is described as the “external norm”, flowing from 
sociological theories of “Social Comparison” and economic theories of 
“Interdependent Preferences” (Easterlin, 2001). 
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The notion of an internal norm suggests that aspirations are formed by own 
income levels in the recent past. Thus, changes in income affect subjective well-
being more than the actual level of income and casual evidence indicates that 
workers prefer increasing wage profiles (Loewenstein and Sicherman, 1991; 
Frank and Hutchens, 1993). Paraphrasing Becker & Murphy (1988) the internal 
norm considers wages as “harmfully addictive”. This is a consequence of the fact 
that individuals adapt to new situations, by adjusting their expectations in 
accordance with social science theories of habituation - adaptation (Helson, 1964). 
In the psychological literature such phenomena are called “hedonic treadmills” 
(Brickman and Campbell, 1971). In the 1970’s pioneering work by the “Leyden 
School” on individual welfare functions describe this behavioural pattern as the 
“Preference Shift Parameter” (van Praag and Kapteyn, 1973). This term 
formalized the empirical observation of the tendency of individuals to adjust 
their welfare function by increasing their material wants proportionately to a rise 
in their income or earnings. About 60-80% of the welfare effect due to an increase 
of income is eliminated by the “Preference Shift”. Casual evidence shows that a 
rise in earnings initially increases job satisfaction, but as individuals become used 
to the new situation, their job satisfaction declines to its original level (Clark, 
1999). This has also been labeled as “Preference Drift” (Groot and van den Brink, 
1999; Grund and Sliwka, 2001).  
According to the external norm of reference view, aspirations are formed by 
income comparisons with a group of reference i.e. individuals with similar 
characteristics to whom one relates the most. Contrary to the standard 
neoclassical view, the concept of relative utility is not new. Adam Smith suggests 
that “people judge the utility or value associated with any job, by comparing it with the 
other jobs available, and the utility associated in them”2. Karl Marx argued that “a 
house may be small or large; as long as the surrounding houses are equally small it 
satisfies all social demands for a dwelling. But if a palace rises beside the little house, the 
little house shrinks into a hut”3. In similar vein, Layard (2003) describes the “rivalry 
                                                 
2 Cited by Cappelli & Sherer, 1988. 
3 Cited by: Easterlin, 1974; Höllander, 2001. 
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process” as one where individuals compare what they have to what other people 
have and if others get more, then they also need more to feel as good as before. 
The review in Rees (1993) indicates that the wages earned by “others” are a 
powerful force in determining labour market outcomes. This mechanism works 
through “the imperfection of labour markets, which generates a zone of indeterminacy, 
where, motivated by individual perceptions and social comparisons, individual and 
collective bargaining can take place”. Empirical evidence showing that relative 
earnings affect job satisfaction negatively has been provided by several 
economists (Hamermesh, 1977; 2001; Cappelli and Sherer, 1988; Clark and 
Oswald, 1996; Clark, 1996; 1997; Watson et al., 1996; Sloane and Williams, 1996). 
Peer group earnings exhibit an effect opposite in sign, but comparable in absolute 
magnitude to the effect of own earnings. Further studies have found supporting 
evidence for the importance of “relative deprivation” theory for individual 
welfare, in terms of satisfaction with life. Those include van de Stadt, Kapteyn & 
van de Geer (1985) for the Netherlands, Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) for Germany, 
McBride (2001), Blanchflower & Oswald (2004), and Luttmer (2005) for the 
United States. The above studies point out that subjective well-being and job 
satisfaction are partly relative concepts. Runciman, 1966 views the importance of 
“relative deprivation theory” in the context of theories of interdependent 
preferences, as the early works of Veblen (1899) and Duesenberry (1949) termed 
the potential of social comparisons in consumption and savings decisions (Frank, 
1989).  
In contrast, another strand of theories of social comparisons points out a totally 
different dimension namely that income comparison can give rise to a positive 
cognitive effect on individual well-being. A strand of this literature emphasizes 
the potentially influential informational content social comparisons can have 
when the individual’s future is dubious in an environment of economic 
uncertainty. In this view, individual welfare depends not only on own current 
income but also on expected future income. However, individual knowledge 
about the future income path is unknown or at best a rough estimate. Thus, if at 
some point some members of the reference group (relatives, neighbours or 
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colleagues) witness an improvement in their earnings, income or social status, 
then the individual’s expectations about own future circumstances are positively 
influenced.  Hirschman defined this as the “tunnel effect” (Hirschman, with 
Rothschild, 1973), which operates because upward mobility of others supplies 
information to the individual about a high probability of own advance. The 
gratification and optimism caused by this information suspends or even 
outweights the individual’s potential feelings of envy towards the advancement 
of others. Yet, this effect may be short-lived. If expectations are not realized after 
some time, then “relative deprivation” might dominate. Ravallion & Lokshin 
(2000) have made this concept operational. They show that preferences for 
redistribution in Russia are as important for the poor as for the rich who view the 
future with uncertainty. Senik (2004[a]) found a significantly positive effect of 
“comparison income” on life satisfaction in Russia, evidence in favour of the 
“tunnel effect” operating in a volatile and unstable economic and political 
environment. In a similar vein, Senik (2004[b]) finds that this positive “cognitive” 
effect holds for another 6 Eastern-European countries in economic transition, in 
contrast to the rest 14 Western-European countries where “relative deprivation” 
dominates social comparisons. 
A second strand in which social comparisons can exert positive cognitive effects 
on well-being is the theory of “Social Capital” (Ravallion and Lokshin, 2005). 
Pioneering work in this field is again initiated by Hirschman (1958) and recently 
there has been an increased interest in examining social capital as a determinant 
of economic development (The World Bank, 1997; 2000). In this view, rises in 
peer income can exert a positive externality to individual well-being, in the form 
of an “increased security effect”. Thus, a gain is derived from the help that people 
in need can receive from better off friends, relatives or neighbours. This requires 
a community whose members support each other so that friends and neighbours 
are viewed as part of an individual’s ‘’social capital’. Ravallion and Lokshin 
(2005) describe such a society as a “Moral Economy”. They make this concept 
operational by setting up a model of interdependent preferences with risk 
sharing, applicable to underdeveloped / developing countries. The empirical 
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evidence from Malawi reveals a positive effect of the income of friends and 
neighbours on individual well-being.  
This paper examines if there is a potential conflict in the way people of different 
personal financial circumstances view their peers and provides empirical 
evidence and reveals the existence of a positive transitory comparison effect 
which dominates the permanent “relative deprivation” effect on job satisfaction 
of employees in financial strain. 
3. Methodology 
3.1  The Data 
This study uses the first 11 waves of the British Household Panel Survey4 (1991-
2001) to examine the effect of social comparisons on job satisfaction. It utilizes a 
nationally representative household survey which provides information on 
individual job satisfaction, earnings and various demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics. The sample is an unbalanced panel of 11,913 
individuals in paid employment, aged between 20 and 60 at the time of the 
interview5, aggregating to a total of 51,653 observations. The sample6 has a 
balanced gender representation, with 49.69% men and 50.31% women. The 
individual average statistical life in the sample is 4.34 years.  
The measure of individual job satisfaction is derived from the following 
question: “Overall, how satisfied are you with your job as a whole?” The answers 
range from 1 indicating complete dissatisfaction to 7 indicating complete 
satisfaction.  
                                                 
4 The data were made available through the ESRC Data Archive. The data was originally 
collected by the ESRC Research Centre on Micro-social Change, at the University of Essex. The 
original collectors of the data, the Data Archive and the affiliated institutions bear no 
responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here. 
5 A previous version of this paper utilized a sample of employees aged 16-65. A referee pointed 
out to us that for the groups closer to the school leaving age and close to retirement, backward 
looking comparisons and forward-looking expectations are of lesser importance, respectively.  
6 The descriptive statistics is given in Table 1. 
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Subjective variables have been treated with suspicion by economists on the 
grounds that they are likely to measure what people say, rather than what they 
do or even feel (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). Furthermore, since the job 
satisfaction variable is of an ordinal nature individuals may “anchor” their scale 
of response at different levels (Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 2002). This could 
render inter-individual comparisons of satisfaction responses meaningless.  
However, significant positive correlations have been found between satisfaction 
responses and emotional expressions as well as brain activity. Ferrer-i-
Carbonell and Frijters (2004) review this evidence and point out that satisfaction 
responses are predictive of human behaviour, meaning that individuals will not 
continue doing an activity from which they obtain dissatisfaction. It seems 
likely that no one is better able to assess and evaluate one’s circumstances than 
the person herself. Regarding interpersonal ordinal comparability, evidence in 
van Praag (1991) indicated that members of the same language community 
translate verbal labels in a context-free framework into similar numerical 
values. Thus, the meanings of “good” and “bad” appear to be the same and 
most importantly, respondents judge the equivalence between these verbal 
labels and a numerical scale in a similar way. Furthermore, psychological 
evidence (Sandvik et al., 1993; Diener and Lucas, 1999) indicates individuals 
somehow accurately predict satisfaction levels of others – even from different 
cultural communities – from pictures and videos.    
The motivation of this study is straightforward. Empirical findings suggest the 
dominance of positive cognitive effects in income comparisons when the 
general economic environment is uncertain, and the dominance of relative 
deprivation in western societies. This study examines whether it is the 
individual-specific financial circumstances, rather than the general environment 
that determine the direction of the comparison effect on satisfaction with work. 
Thus, two methodological issues are of primary importance for this study. The 
first is the identification of individual-specific financial circumstances and the 
second is the definition of the earnings of the reference group. Individual 
financial circumstances will determine the separation of the sample into 
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financially “rich” and “poor” segments. Several disaggregating criteria have 
been utilized in the poverty and low-pay literature, all having debatable 
validity arising from issues of precision and other methodological flaws. Of 
great importance are considerations about the regional and/or relative nature 
of poverty. Furthermore, any custom definition of low-pay7 in the BHPS 
generated samples where more than 75% of the low-paid employees are women 
and more than 90% are part-time employees (Leontaridi and Sloane, 2003; 
Manning and Petrangolo, 2003; Diaz-Serrano and Vieira, 2005).  
In order to refrain from the debates on definition, and the regional nature of low-
pay employment, this study introduces the use of financial vulnerability 
indicators and defines two sub-groups of the employed population; the 
“financially vulnerable” and the “financially sound”. The financial vulnerability 
variable is derived from the question: “Overall, how would you characterize your 
financial situation in the current year”? Responses vary from 1 to 5, translating into 
the respective labels: “Finding it very difficult”, “Finding it difficult”, “Just about 
getting by”, “Doing alright” and “Living comfortably”. Thus, the financially 
vulnerable are defined as individuals who reply less than or equal to 3, i.e. less 
than “just about getting by”. Financially sound are considered to be those in the 
highest two categories. As Table 2 indicates this definition classifies about 30% of 
the observations as financially vulnerable. This percentage is very similar to that 
obtained by any typical definition of low-pay. The important difference is that 
the two sub-groups have very similar and balanced representation in terms of 
gender, age and part-time status, in contrast to any other typical definition (Table 
1). Financial vulnerability indicators have previously been used by Ravallion & 
Lokshin (2000) in studying financial satisfaction and preferences for 
redistribution and Lydon & Chevalier (2002). Hamermesh (2001) warns against 
regressing subjective variables against each other. It is also likely that the 
assessment of the financial vulnerability is correlated with own earnings, giving 
                                                 
7 Typical definitions of low pay examined and not presented here are the two thirds of the 
median threshold, the mean of yearly or average lifetime earnings by region. Theodossiou (1998) 
defines the employed population under low pay as those belonging to the last three deciles of the 
earnings distribution.  
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rise to issues of multicollinearity in the satisfaction regression. However, Table 3 
indicates that there is enough variation in the relationship between objective 
earnings centiles and subjective assessments of financial circumstances8. 
Furthermore, the pairwise correlation coefficient between the assessment of the 
financial situation and the earnings variable is 0.217 and 0.146 with the job 
satisfaction variable.  
The use of the financial vulnerability variable has a number of advantages for 
this study. In line with the aspiration level theory, it is assumed that workers 
view the remuneration of their work as a measure of financial power, evaluating 
the extent to which their earnings satisfy their financial needs. In this perspective, 
earnings affect utility from work according to one’s financial needs and to the 
extent that these are satisfied. This is in accordance with Weiss’s (2002) definition 
of job satisfaction and the Levy-Garboua & Montmarquette’s (1997) explanation 
of job satisfaction as posterior affirmation. Table 3 indicates that there is no 
paradox in job satisfaction between the financially vulnerable and the financially 
secure employees. 
3.2 The hypothesis 
As discussed above this study diverges from the view that “relative deprivation” 
dominates social comparisons in western societies, while positive cognitive 
effects are dominant in environments with economic uncertainty. It first proposes 
the decomposition of the effect of comparison earnings into a permanent 
affective and a positive cognitive effect. Second, it examines issues of dominance 
of the two effects on job satisfaction, springing from the individual financial 
circumstances. Attitudinal responses exhibit an affective and a cognitive 
component. With respect to job satisfaction, the affective component is related to 
the extent to which one finds his or her job enriching or rewarding. The cognitive 
component is related with the fulfillment of aspirations. In the context of this 
study it is assumed that earnings comparisons affect the formation of job 
                                                 
8 The distribution is similar when earnings centiles are defined by major geographical area.  
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satisfaction through both the affective and the cognitive channel. Reference 
earnings can be thought to influence the affective component depending on how, 
in general, one feels about his or her peers. Their effect through the cognitive 
component and its magnitude are determined by individual-specific 
circumstances at any point in time. In this context, job satisfaction is assumed to 
be a relative concept.  
Formally, following Senik (2004[b]), the function for utility from work is defined 
as:  
[    ]    (1)  itititi WWEWfJS ),(, 1,,, +=
where: JSit indicates job satisfaction at time t, Wit is the employee‘s current wage, 
E(Wit) is the expectation of one’s wage and iW  is the earnings of the reference 
group. The key term is the individual’s expectations. While it is expected that 
0>
dW
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>
WdE
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dJS that is ambiguous. That is because 
the expectation of one’s wage entails uncertainty part of which is assumed to be 
resolved by observing the evolution of reference group income inter alia. Thus:  
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The sign of the first term in (3) is expected to be negative, based on the notion of 
the “quest for status” in western societies. The sign of the second term is 
ambiguous. It depends on how the individual feels about the members of her 
reference group in a particular point in time, on individual circumstances at that 
time and on how the individual interprets the evolution of the earnings of his or 
her peers when forming own expectations about own income path.  
Earnings Aspirations and Job Satisfaction (2006) 15
This study examines the signs and the relative magnitude of the effects of these 
two terms. It furthermore tests the hypothesis that ratio of the two effects is 
significantly different between groups of employees experiencing financial 
vulnerability and those living in financial comfort. The intuition regarding this 
hypothesis is that relative deprivation dominates interpersonal comparisons for 
financially sound employees, while the informational content of such 
comparisons increases job satisfaction of the financially distressed. This is a 
positive effect that dominates the effect of “relative deprivation” in the short-run 
for the latter group. The two effects are isolated by decomposing the overall 
reference group earnings estimates into the permanent and the transitory 
component.  
3.3 Obtaining reference group earnings estimates 
The measure used as a proxy for the earnings of the reference group consists of 
the predicted values from an earnings equation on the pooled sample with year 
fixed effects9. Thus, a standard human capital theory (Mincer, 1958; Becker, 1964) 
earnings equation of the following form is estimated: 
it
t
titm
m
mti vDXW ++= ∑∑
=
11
1
,)ln( δ     (4) 
where; Wit indicates usual gross monthly earnings. Responses by individuals 
about their usual monthly earnings are divided by the GDP deflator10 and 
transformed into 1991 real earnings values in pounds. Xm indicates the individual 
and job related characteristics, D are year fixed effects and v is the error term.  t 
Table 4 reports the specification and the estimation results for equation (4). Usual 
hours of work are not included in the specification to avoid multicollinearity in 
job satisfaction equations, but it also implies that individuals compare their 
earnings, but not their hours of work (Layard, 2003).  The specification follows 
                                                 
9 Predicted values from separate cross-sectional earnings equations were also obtained from cross-sectional 
earnings equations. Results and conclusions were not different from the ones presented here when this 
measure was used to reflect comparison group earnings in job satisfaction equations.  
10 World Development Indicators (2005) 
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closely Clark & Oswald (1996). It includes more explanatory variables than the 
satisfaction equation to avoid perfect multicollinearity when income and all of its 
statistical determinants are included. The use of predicted values from earnings 
equations to approximate for comparison income is common in the literature. 
These are sought to approximate the level of earnings an individual should 
expect to earn given his or her personal and human capital characteristics. 
Drakopoulos & Theodossiou (1997) refer to this approximation as an attempt to 
capture the “concept of a benchmarking” i.e. the individual “subjective target 
income”. However, Manski (1993) questions the prospect of individuals 
forecasting wage in the same manner econometricians do. This view is in line 
with Tobin (1980) and Okun (1981) and is also discussed in McAvinchey & 
Mavromaras (2004). Several alternatives have been utilized to approximate the 
earnings of reference, including comparisons to the standard of living of parents 
when they were at the current age of the respondent (McBride, 2001), average 
income defined by age, education and region cells (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005). 
However, since the external norm of comparison is a subjective and individual-
specific notion, usual data constraints force the researchers to seek the best 
available proxy. This is also the case in point here.  
3.4 The Specification and Estimation Procedure  
The microeconometric analysis of job satisfaction is initially based on two 
specifications aimed at depicting the effects of norms related to earnings. The 
specifications are based on the state of the knowledge in the current literature 
subject to the data limitations. The first specification is the simplest variant of the 
standard theory with own income, hours of work and a vector of personal and 
work related characteristics. In view of the concavity assumption of utility in 
income the earnings variable is included as a logarithm. The empirical evidence 
so far indicates a significantly positive effect of income on job satisfaction, but not 
of a large magnitude. The second specification introduces the earnings of the 
reference group and is of primary interest. So far job satisfaction studies which 
take into account some form of reference group earnings have indicated a 
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negative relationship between peer wages and individual job satisfaction. In 
cases where a non-significant or positive relationship appeared for sub-groups or 
the population as a whole, this is attributed to misspecification or to the 
inappropriateness of the measure used to capture the earnings of the reference 
group.   
Job satisfaction is an ordered categorical variable. Hence, ordered probit models 
(Zavoiva and McKelvey, 1975) are estimated. In this framework, there is a latent 
probability of reporting a job satisfaction level (JS). This can be described as: 
     (5) ittij
j
jtit ZaDJS ε++= ∑∑ ,11
1
*
where JS* is the unobserved utility from work, Zit is a vector of exogenous 
personal and work related characteristics, δj is the vector of coefficients to be 
estimated, and αt indicates year fixed effects. Then the reported job satisfaction 
levels can be described as: 
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where; μ … μ1 6 are the cut-off points for the latent variable, unknown parameters 
to be estimated along with δ . Furthermore, in the above model ε11 it~IN(0, σ 2ε ), 
independent of Zit for all i, t.   
In the specifications a decomposition for several continuous variables is utilised, 
by including both their average value per individual and their annual values. In 
the context of discrete choice models with random effects, this transformation is 
                                                 
11 Greene (2003), section 21.8, p.736 
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known as Mundlak’s (1978) version of Chamberlain’s (1980) assumption12. This 
is a variant of random effects models introducing fixed effects for continuous 
variables that are assumed to be correlated with the individual unobserved 
characteristics (van Praag, et al., 2003; Ferrer-i-Carbonell & van Praag, 2003; 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005). Senik (2004[a]) also introduces this decomposition in 
the context of the pooled ordered probit model .13  The justification in its use is 
that changes in some of the variables will not have an immediate full extent effect 
on job satisfaction. Thus, this specification offers an intuitive interpretation for 
the adaptation process taking place as a response to the change of variables like 
earnings, reference earnings and hours of work.  
Hence, equation (5) is rewritten as:  
 
ittitGiYitYit DGaYYaJS εβ ++++=     (6) 
 
where Y is a vector containing continuous variables in a logarithmic form, 
including own earnings, normal weekly hours of work, paid overtime hours, and 
number of children. In the second specification, reference earnings are also 
included in the Y vector. The second term in the right-hand side contains the 
average value per individual of the variables in Y, over the sample lifetime. 
Vector G includes personal and job characteristics in the form of dummy 
variables. Further manipulation of (6) leads into:  
 
                                                 
12 Wooldridge (2002), 11.5 and 13.8.2, p.328 and p.405 
13 Taking advantage of the panel structure of the dataset, the models could alternatively be 
estimated with the inclusion of individual random effects accounting for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity, constant across time and uncorrelated by structure with the rest of the explanatory 
variables. It is considered appropriate to utilise the pooled model and present bootstrapped 
standard errors for the specifications with reference group earnings, since this is derived from a 
first stage regression. Bootstrapping standard errors in the context of a random effects ordered 
probit model is yet computationally unfeasible in terms of the time needed. All specifications 
presented in the following section have also been estimated in models with random effects. None 
of the conclusions in this paper is affected when the latter model is used. Results are available upon 
request. 
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    ittitGiYYiitYit DGaYaYYaJS εβ +++++−= )()(    (7) 
 
Equation (7) splits the effect of the selected continuous variables into a 
permanent (between individuals) effect equal to (a+b) and a temporary (within 
individuals) effect, equal to a.  
At the end of the next section the robustness of the findings and some extensions 
are examined by estimating the model of the second specification for separate 
groups of interest.  
 
3. Empirical Results & Discussion 
Table 5 presents the results for the estimated baseline job satisfaction probit 
model. The estimated coefficients14 and standard errors corrected for 
heterogeneity are presented, clustered on the individual level to correct for fixed 
effects15. The full estimation results are presented only for the full specification. 
For the remaining specifications only the results on income variables are reported 
for space considerations. Three sets of results are presented, for the full sample of 
employees and then separately for the financially vulnerable and the financially 
sound (Columns 2 and 3, respectively). The null hypothesis that the financially 
vulnerable and the financially sound employees have the same job satisfaction 
equations is rejected. The likelihood ratio test using the column 1 (restricted 
model) and columns 2 and 3 (unrestricted models) gives a value of 388.8. The 5% 
level of significance for χ2(60) is 55.8. Hence, the financially vulnerable and the 
financially sound employees appear to have different job satisfaction equations.  
In general, the results are consistent with the literature regarding the 
determinants of job satisfaction in Britain. Female employees are much more 
                                                 
14 In the ordered probit model, the direction of the effect on the probabilities P(JS=7) and  P(JS=1) 
is unambiguously determined by the sign of the coefficients. This sign does not always determine 
the direction of the effect for the intermediate outcomes (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 506). 
15 Wooldridge (2002), 11.5 and 13.8.2, p.328, 
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satisfied with their jobs compared to men, in accordance with the empirical 
observation of the so called Anglo-Saxon paradox. The effect is higher among the 
financially vulnerable employees. Job satisfaction is U-shaped in age with a 
minimum around the age of thirty-four. Part-time employees are more satisfied 
with their work, and the result is twice as large for the financially sound group as 
for the financially vulnerable. However, this may be an outcome of self-selection 
into part-time work since one could guess that compared to the financially 
vulnerable, financially sound individuals would be happier to take up part-time 
jobs as family income compensates for the loss in earnings entailed by the part-
time status. In line with the education paradox (Clark and Oswald (1996)), it is 
found that less educated people derive higher satisfaction from their jobs 
compared to their more educated counterparts. Furthermore, unskilled workers 
appear to be more satisfied with their jobs, compared to the skilled-group. Both 
effects are larger for the financially vulnerable group. Overall, healthy people are 
much more satisfied with their job and whites appear to be more satisfied 
compared to other races. With respect to industry, regional and year fixed effects, 
workers in agriculture (reference group) are the most satisfied employees, 
workers in London are the least satisfied ceteris paribus, and a negative trend in 
job satisfaction is prevalent in all years after 1991.  
Wages are generally considered to have a positive impact on job satisfaction16. 
However, several studies argue that relative wages matter most, while own 
earnings are of secondary importance or even exert insignificant effect on job 
satisfaction. In Table 5, the wage effect is split into a permanent and a transitory 
component. Interestingly, the results indicate that a higher transitory wage has a 
significantly positive effect on job satisfaction. However, the permanent wage 
over the sample lifetime exhibits a significantly negative effect, almost equal in 
magnitude to the opposite transitory wage effect. A significantly negative 
                                                 
16 Following most of the relevant literature in this area, this study does not consider issues of endogeneity 
in the job satisfaction-wage or job satisfaction-hours of work relationship. The literature abstracts from this 
issue, since taking into account the endogeneity of wages or hours of work in the job satisfaction equations 
raises a number of difficulties associated with the ad hoc choice of identifying restrictions upon which the 
results might be sensitive. Notable exceptions are Lydon and Chevalier (2002), Pouliakas and Theodossiou 
(2004) and McAvinchey and Mavromaras (2004). 
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permanent wage effect on job satisfaction has been also reported for Britain and 
Denmark, in a study using ECHP data (EPICURUS Project Conventional Report, 
2004). This effect can be attributed to high marginal tax rates. However,  these are 
relatively low in Britain (25%) compared to Denmark. A more appropriate 
justification for the nature of this between groups effect might be related to the 
well-documented relatively low job satisfaction of the high-paid employees in the 
United Kingdom. It appears that it is the “shock effect” of an increase in 
transitory earnings that raises job satisfaction, rather than the “level effect” of 
permanent earnings. The transitory “shock effect” raises expectations about the 
trend of future earnings more than the path of the actual earnings. Individuals 
soon adjust their lifestyle to the level of actual earnings which fall short of their 
exuberant expectations.  Hence, low-paid workers report higher job satisfaction 
than their high paid counterparts as they form dispropotionaly less enthusiastic 
expectations than the high paid workers. The opposite picture emerges for the 
usual hours per week variable. An increase in the hours of work has a 
significantly negative effect on job satisfaction. This effect is opposite and similar 
in magnitude on average to that of increases in own earnings for the financially 
sound group. The effect is smaller in magnitude compared to that for the 
financially vulnerable. The between groups effect of work hours indicates that 
ceteris paribus, people who work more hours on average are more satisfied with 
their jobs. Interestingly, rises in paid overtime hours exhibit a positive influence 
on workers’ job satisfaction in all models.  
The expected job satisfaction of the representative financially vulnerable and 
financially sound individual is equal to -1.372 and -0.399 respectively. Both of 
these fall between the cut off points 5 and 6, corresponding to the category 6 on 
the original scale from 1 to 7. In terms of the composition of expected job 
satisfaction, the two income terms are the strongest predictors of job satisfaction 
among all included variables (with the exception of the age variable). Their 
respective effects on job satisfaction are almost equal in opposite directions. This 
implies that the two effects cancel out in the long run. Thus, while a rise in 
earnings increases job satisfaction in the short run, it also increases expectations 
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about future earnings more than proportionately. As people adapt to the new 
level of higher earnings actual perceptions about the level of earnings fall short of 
the formed expectations and hence job satisfaction declines.  
Table 6 introduces the second specification, including the estimated earnings of 
the reference group. In this specification the standard errors are bootstrapped, 
since reference earnings are the outcome of an initial regression. The effect of the 
earnings of the reference group is split into a permanent (level) and a transitory 
(shock) component. The motivation for this decomposition is that observation of 
“peer” earnings has two effects on job satisfaction. The first - a “permanent 
effect” - depends on how one feels about his or her peers earnings ceteris paribus. 
The second – a “transitory effect” - depends on the environment, the timing and 
the particular situation of the individual. The former approximates the general 
“level” of reference norm– a status effect - and it is an average in the sample 
lifespan, while the second indicates short-run effects arising from the evolution 
of reference earnings of people with the exact same characteristics. Results in 
Table 6 reveal two opposite effects. The level of comparison earnings over the 
sample life span exhibits a significantly negative effect, in line with the theory of 
“relative deprivation”. Its coefficient is -0.296 for the whole sample and the t-
statistic 
22
2
21 αα σσ −
− aai  indicates that the difference in the coefficients between the 
financially vulnerable and the financially sound sub-groups is not statistically 
significant. However, the transitory effect of reference earnings on job satisfaction 
is significantly positive. For the whole sample of the employed individuals in 
column 1 this effect is smaller in magnitude compared to the negative permanent 
effect.  
Separate estimations for the sub-samples of financially vulnerable and financially 
sound individuals reveal an interesting pattern concerning the decomposition of 
the effect of reference earnings. For the financially vulnerable sub-sample, the 
“shock” effect of reference earnings is 1.62 times higher than the negative 
permanent between-groups effect. For individuals in a financially vulnerable 
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situation, this may be interpreted as the dominance of the informational content 
of reference earnings at a point in time over general feelings of envy drawn from 
earnings comparisons among peers. This interpretation is supported by the 
results in column 3 for the financially sound sub-sample. For this group the 
transitory effect of the reference earnings on job satisfaction is again positive but 
0.53 times the permanent negative effect. The difference in the two transitory 
reference wage coefficients between the two groups is statistically significant at 
the 5% level. Thus, the positive cognitive effect of reference earnings is relatively 
more important for the financially vulnerable group. This comparison effect is 
about four times higher than that of the own income effect for the financially 
vulnerable but only 1.37 for the financially sound. Thus, while relative 
deprivation is the dominant state in social comparisons for the latter group, the 
positive cognitive effect is dominant for the former.  
An increase in the earnings of the reference group appears to two effects. The 
“shock” effect provides information to the individual about his or her prospects 
in the near future. The “level” effect determines the permanent level of reference. 
While individuals obtain satisfaction from the former effect in the short-run, if 
their formed high expectations are not met the permanent rise in their reference 
earnings norm reduces their job satisfaction in the long-run, as they adapt to their 
new circumstances. The shock effect is higher for the financially vulnerable. For 
this specification, the financially vulnerable representative individual has an 
expected job satisfaction of -0.721 and the financially sound -0.752. The effects of 
variables that are likely to be correlated with the reference earnings, such as 
gender, education, age and occupation are virtually the same in Tables 5 and 6. 
The coefficients of own earnings and hours of work are somewhat changed in 
magnitude, which indicates as expected that these two terms are correlated with 
the reference earnings variable17.  
                                                 
17 The correlation between the three variables affects the magnitude, but not the nature of the 
results and conclusions in this study. Several alternative specifications have been tried but the 
results did not alter the nature of the above findings. These specifications excluded earnings 
and hours of work from the job satisfaction equations with reference income, included hours of 
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One could argue that the measure used to capture the reference earnings is an 
alternative expression of own income, which will exhibit a positive coefficient if 
observed earnings are contaminated with measurement error. As a robustness 
check for the informational content of this measure, a number of models are 
estimated in order to examine if the effect of the measure used to capture the 
reference earnings is consistent with intuition in a number of sample 
disaggregations. All specifications have the same independent variables with the 
specicication reported in Table 6. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 
7. Panel A of Table 7 reports the results of a regression for two working 
population sub-groups, one with earnings tied to an incremental scale18and one 
without. Results indicate that the cognitive impact of reference income vanishes 
for these whose pay is set via an incremental scale. Importantly, the negative 
permanent impact of the earnings of the reference group remains. These effects 
hold for both the financially vulnerable and financially sound. The positive 
transitory effect of reference earnings is again higher for the financially 
vulnerable whose pay does is not tied to an incremental scale. This supports the 
proposition that individuals utilise the information provided by the evolution of 
the earnings of their reference group to form expectations about their own future. 
This information effect vanishes when there is certainty about the evolution of 
one’s earnings path. 
Furthermore, Senik (2004[a]) argues that the information effect should be 
stronger for the young, as they have more time to seize job opportunities and the 
most to gain from information. Panel B examines this argument by estimating the 
regressions separately for people younger than 35 years of age and for the older. 
Indeed the cognitive effect is higher in magnitude for the young compared to the 
old for the sample overall. The ratio of the within to the between effect is greater 
than one for the young group and less than one for the older group. Results vary 
                                                                                                                                               
work in the earnings equation etc. Finally, regressions without the decomposition, using the 
levels of the variables only, render a significantly positive comparison effect for the financially 
vulnerable and a significantly negative comparison effect of smaller magnitude for the 
financially sound. The effect is statistically insignificant for the whole sample.  
18 The correlation coefficient between type of pay (incremental scale) and financial vulnerability 
is -0.098. 
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with respect to the financially vulnerable and the financially sound group. In 
general the pattern is that cognition has a higher impact in the former whereas 
the affection effect influences more the latter.  
Another argument of interest is that the effect of “relative deprivation” is 
asymmetric and upward-looking (Duesenberry (1949), Höllander (2001)). Ferrer-
i-Carbonell (2005) presents evidence from subjective well-being equations in 
Germany in support of this argument. In contrast, McBride (2001) indicates 
“relative deprivation” effects are stronger for people with high income. Easterlin 
(1974) shows that the effects of internal and external income norms are present in 
all groups and at all income levels. Theodossiou and Drakopoulos (1997) claim 
that people earning above their reference group have different priority-setting 
mechanisms compared to those earning below. In Panel C of Table 7, the model 
is also estimated for employees who earn more and for those who earn less than 
or equal to their reference group. It is found that the ratios of within-to-between 
group effects of reference earnings are greater than unity only for the groups 
earning less than their reference group, overall and in both financial situations. 
The negative permanent comparison effect is much higher in magnitude for 
people earning more than their reference group. These results support McBride’s 
(2001) finding using U.S. data that the negative income comparison effect on 
well-being is stronger for the high-income earners compared to the remainder. 
This could indicate a different priority-setting behaviour for those earning below 
their norm of reference compared to those having achieved or surpassed the 
earnings of the “relative others”. In terms of the terminology in Akerlof and 
Kranton (2000), a status – seeking pattern emerges for those earnings more than 
their “peers”, while a rather more “conformist” pattern prevails for those who 
have not surpassed their “norm of reference”.  
Panel D further examines the effects for individuals who are not highly satisfied 
with their job security and for those who are. Results indicate that the cognitive 
positive transitory impact of reference earnings is higher for the groups with low 
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job security. For the financially sound group the cognitive impact of reference 
earnings is insignificant, regardless of whether the job provides job security.   
Finally, Panels (E) and (F) in Table 7 examine some more specific “social capital” 
considerations regarding the earnings of the reference group namely, whether 
there are potential uncertainty reducing effects arising from peer earnings 
comparisons. It should be noted that it is rather unlikely that “decreased 
uncertainty” effects can arise from the expectation of help from colleagues in 
times of own hardship. It is more likely that in such times people will seek for 
help from friends or relatives. Two questions available in the BHPS are used. The 
first, available from Wave 6 requires individuals to respond to the question: “Is 
there someone out of the household you can borrow money from”? The second question 
is: “Do you have anyone who can help in a time of crisis”?19 The results do not accord 
well and in some cases oppose the expected relationships from social capital 
considerations. This similarity of the effects of reference earnings on the job 
satisfaction for the two groups is interpreted as evidence in support of the 
argument that the evolution of the earnings of the reference group has a 
transitory informational impact which is higher and dominant in times of 
uncertainty.  
5.  Conclusions 
This paper presented empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis that the 
reference group earnings exhibit a dual impact on job satisfaction. The empirical 
analysis utilized the sub-sample of employed individuals from the first 11 waves 
of a large British micro-paned household survey dataset (BHPS). The approach 
used to explore the nature of relative earnings originates from the standard 
approach (Clark & Oswald, 1996). It distinguishes between financially vulnerable 
and financially sound employed individuals. The two sub-groups are defined 
according to the way individuals themselves evaluate their current financial 
situation in a given year. Furthermore, following Senik (2004[a]; 2004[b]) the 
                                                 
19 This question is transformed into a binary variable, coded 1 if people respond they have more than one 
such person. 
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impact of the earnings of the reference group is separated into a “level” and a 
“shock” component in the nature of earnings comparisons. The former has an 
impact on the “affective” component of job satisfaction, while the latter affects 
the “cognitive” component. The contribution of this study at the subjective well-
being literature is a twofold. It adheres to the empirical literature on the role of 
interdependent preferences on individual well being at work. It reviews the 
literature on the nature and the direction of the effect of reference earnings on job 
satisfaction and subjective well-being and proposes the dual nature of earnings 
comparisons. So far, the prevalence of the tunnel effect has been documented in 
countries where the majority of the population lives in poverty and/or in an 
unstable economic environment. Although this is justified as an information 
effect it induces interpretations of an ascetic lifestyle on average in certain 
countries, in the Stoic sense. This study suggests that “tunnel effects” can exist 
among the working population in countries where the economic environment is 
stable. It is the individual financial circumstances that entail distress and 
uncertainty about the future. To the knowledge of the authors this is the first 
study that proposes the presence of two opposite effects of significant magnitude 
from earnings comparisons to job satisfaction within a western society.  
The results indicate that the cognitive impact on job satisfaction from social 
comparisons is higher for the financially vulnerable. The nature of this 
informational effect is supported by the finding that the cognitive effect is 
insignificant for employees whose wage path is set on an annual incremental 
scale. Further specification tests support the view that the effect of relative 
deprivation is higher among the group earning more than their norm of 
reference. This reinforces the argument that affective comparisons are more of a 
status-seeking phenomenon, rather than upward looking.  
A significant positive cognitive impact in social comparisons among the 
financially distressed can give rise to policy arguments related to group 
psychology. Although the evidence presented in this paper is tentative, it can 
give rise to discussion about the treatment of poverty – financial strain as a group 
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phenomenon, rather than as an individual-specific case. It further suggests job 
satisfaction is a relative concept.  
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Appendix: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics 
  
All  
Employed 
Financially 
Vulnerable 
Financially 
Sound 
Number of individuals 11,913 6,536 9,711 
Number of observations 51,653 16,125 35,528 
               
Average Job Satisfaction 5.34 (1.35) 5.08 (1.49) 5.45 1.26) 
Average Real Gross Earnings (1991) 1,098.8 (787.5) 898.6 (536.6) 1,189.7 (862.8) 
% Above Reference Earnings  51.80% 44.82% 54.97% 
% Below Reference Earnings  48.20% 55.18% 45.03% 
          Job Characteristics    
% Full-time 85.41% 82.89% 86.55% 
% Part-time 14.59% 17.11% 13.55% 
% Skilled non-manual 35.34% 28.75% 38.33% 
% Skilled manual 11.76% 10.12% 12.50% 
% Unskilled non-manual 36.16% 39.36% 34.70% 
% Unskilled manual 16.74% 21.77% 14.46% 
% Permanent Contract 94.69% 92.83% 95.54% 
% Temporary Contract 5.31% 7.17% 4.46% 
         Individual Characteristics      
% Male 49.69% 48.29% 49.56% 
% Female 50.31% 51.71% 50.44% 
Average Age 37.7 (10.59) 37.5 (10.42) 37.7 (10.67) 
% Age 20-29 27.20% 26.56% 27.49% 
% Age 30-39 30.27% 31.26% 29.82% 
% Age 40-49 25.66% 26.72% 25.18% 
% Age 50-59 16.87% 15.46% 17.52% 
% Education: "Graduate degree" 2.81% 1.56% 3.38% 
% Education: "College degree" 12.72% 9.79% 14.05% 
% Education: "Teaching, A-level, O-level" 58.30% 55.65% 59.51% 
% Education: "CSE" 6.03% 6.87% 5.65% 
% Education: "None of the above" 20.14% 26.14% 17.42% 
Table 2: Sample Separation, Descriptive Statistics 
  % of the sample Average Real Earnings Average Job Satisfaction
Wave No. of 
Individuals 
Financially 
Sound 
Financially 
Vulnerable 
Financially 
Sound 
Financially 
Vulnerable 
Financially 
Sound 
Financially 
Vulnerable 
1 4,157 62.62% 37.38% 1,148.0[a] 871.1 5.56[a] 5.22 
2 3,872 63.20% 36.80% 1,183.4[a] 881.8 5.53[a] 5.29 
3 3,715 64.66% 35.34% 1,179.6[a] 878.0 5.48[a] 5.13 
4 3,815 66.40% 33.60% 1,186.1[a] 898.5 5.42[a] 5.05 
5 3,795 66.48% 33.52% 1,187.0[a] 917.8 5.42[a] 5.06 
6 3,975 70.69% 29.31% 1,187.1[a] 903.7 5.44[a] 5.07 
7 4,537 71.81% 28.19% 1,172.1[a] 881.5 5.50[a] 5.09 
8 4,536 72.66% 27.34% 1,181.6[a] 891.8 5.41[a] 5.03 
9 6,376 69.84% 30.16% 1,176.6[a] 903.9 5.38[a] 4.99 
10 6,460 69.54% 30.46% 1,217.6[a] 915.0 5.42[a] 5.02 
11 6,415 73.44% 26.56% 1,229.8[a] 928.7 5.47[a] 5.01 
Total 51,653 68.78% 31.22% 1,189.7[a] 898.6 5.45[a] 5.08 
 
[a]: Significant differences between financially vulnerable and financially sound at the 1% level, from a two-sample 
t-test for earnings and a Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank sum non-parametric test for job satisfaction 
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Table 3: The relationship between self-assessments of current financial circumstances with  
objective earnings centiles and job satisfaction 
 - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 1 - - 5 -  Finding it  
Very Difficult 
Finding it  
Quite Difficult 
Just About  
Getting By 
Doing Living 
Comfortably Total Alright 
 Panel A: Real Earnings Distribution 
38.0% 31.6% 24.8% 18.8% 14.8% 1-Low  20.04% 
27.1% 24.5% 24.2% 20.1% 14.9% 2 19.95% 
18.9% 19.6% 22.5% 20.9% 16.8% 3 20.02% 
11.6% 14.8% 17.3% 21.8% 21.1% 4 19.99% 
4.5% 9.6% 11.2% 18.3% 32.4% 5-High  20.00% 
Total 1.51% 4.95% 24.79% 39.59% 29.17% 100.00% 
 
 
 
 
 Panel B: Average Earnings and Job Satisfaction
740.3 853.0 917.4 1,072.9 1,348.9 1,099.0 Average Earnings 
(st. dev) (432.5) (583.7) (530.3) (784.6) (936.4) (787.5) 
4.67 4.90 5.14 5.38 5.55 5.34 Average Job Satisfaction 
(st. dev.) (1.87) (1.59) (1.44) (1.28) (1.23) (1.34) 
44.54% 46.08% 50.88% 58.86% 65.62% 58.01% %  Very Satisfied 
Table 4: Earnings Regression -  OLS – Pooled Sample 
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Real (1991) Usual Gross Monthly Earnings 
Coef. St. Error 
Age Group: 30-39 0.120 [0.007]*** 
Age Group: 40-49 0.136 [0.008]*** 
Age Group: 50-60 0.118 [0.010]*** 
Married/Cohabiting 0.041 [0.006]*** 
Male 0.196 [0.008]*** 
Ln(no. of kids+1) 0.004 [0.006] 
Working daytime 0.013 [0.001]*** 
Permanent Job 0.091 [0.011]*** 
Pay includes bonuses 0.059 [0.005]*** 
Pay includes annual increments 0.014 [0.005]*** 
Full-time Job 0.600 [0.009]*** 
Trade Union at work 0.029 [0.007]*** 
Manager 0.146 [0.005]*** 
Pension member 0.139 [0.007]*** 
Yes Education dummies (7) 
Yes Health dummies (5) 
Yes Establishment Size dummies (5) 
Yes Occupation dummies (78) 
Yes Industry dummies (73) 
Yes Region dummies (18) 
Yes Year fixed effects (11) 
  
Number of Observations 49,792 
Number of Individuals 11,533 
R-squared 0.71 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustering on individuals to correct for serial correlation 
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Table 5: Job Satisfaction Regressions - Ordered Probit Models 
Dependent Variable: Overall Job Satisfaction (Ordinal variable, scaled 1-7) 
  
  
All 
Employed 
Financially 
Vulnerable 
Financially 
Sound 
t-statistic 
(Vulnerable-Sound)
          Intra-individual Effects     
Ln(Usual Monthly Earnings) 0.170 0.147 0.179 -0.598 
  [0.024]*** [0.044]*** [0.030]***  
Ln(Normal Weekly Hours) -0.184 -0.218 -0.163 -0.556 
  [0.046]*** [0.081]*** [0.057]***  
Ln(Paid Overtime Hours) 0.033 0.039 0.028 0.635 
  [0.008]*** [0.014]*** [0.010]***  
Ln(No. children+1) 0.08 0.074 0.078 -0.082 
  [0.022]*** [0.040]* [0.028]***  
          Inter-individual Effects     
Mean[ln(Usual Monthly Earnings)] -0.188 -0.173 -0.202 0.428 
  [0.032]*** [0.054]*** [0.039]***  
Mean[ln(Normal Weekly Hours)] 0.182 -0.024 0.285 -2.525*** 
  [0.061]*** [0.098] [0.073]*** 
Mean[ln(Paid Overtime Hours)] -0.005 0.005 -0.007 0.413 
  [0.015] [0.022] [0.018]  
Mean[ln(No. children+1)] 0.076 0.045 0.100 -0.944 
  [0.028]*** [0.047] [0.034]***  
Financially Vulnerable -0.298 - - - 
 [0.014]***    
Male -0.182 -0.226 -0.161 -1.684* 
  [0.020]*** [0.030]*** [0.023]***  
Full-time job -0.222 -0.123 -0.258 2.048** 
  [0.034]*** [0.050]** [0.042]***  
Age -0.034 -0.026 -0.038 1.121 
  [0.006]*** [0.009]*** [0.007]***  
Age squared/1000 0.493 0.377 0.558 -1.224 
  [0.076]*** [0.118]*** [0.089]***  
       Job Satisfaction reaches a minimum at the age of: 34.483 34.483 34.050  
Education: "Graduate degree" 0.052 0.176 0.013 1.723* 
  [0.048] [0.078]** [0.054]  
Education: "Teaching, A-level, O-level" 0.153 0.230 0.123 2.309*** 
  [0.024]*** [0.038]*** [0.027]***  
Education: "CSE" 0.267 0.333 0.235 1.274 
  [0.042]*** [0.058]*** [0.050]***  
Education: "None of the above" 0.355 0.398 0.339 0.914 
  [0.034]*** [0.050]*** [0.041]***  
White 0.083 0.116 0.062 0.700 
  [0.043]* [0.057]** [0.052]  
Excellent Health 0.239 0.215 0.249 -1.183 
  [0.014]*** [0.025]*** [0.017]***  
Married/Cohabiting 0.022 0.054 0.013 1.222 
  [0.018] [0.027]** [0.021]  
New job - new position 0.169 0.14 0.187 -1.496 
  [0.016]*** [0.025]*** [0.020]***  
Same job - new position 0.159 0.146 0.165 -0.624 
  [0.015]*** [0.026]*** [0.017]***  
Occupation: "Skilled Non-Manual" 0.006 -0.059 0.029 -1.929* 
  [0.023] [0.038] [0.026]  
Occupation: "Unskilled Non-manual" -0.068 -0.120 -0.048 -1.498 
  [0.024]*** [0.039]*** [0.028]*  
Occupation: "Unskilled Manual" -0.180 -0.212 -0.174 -0.652 
  [0.030]*** [0.046]*** [0.034]***  
Energy & Water Supplies -0.417 -0.565 -0.356 -1.181 
  [0.096]*** [0.141]*** [0.108]***  
Extraction & Manufacture   of Metals,  Minerals -0.235 -0.341 -0.176 -0.994 
                                                               & Chemicals [0.092]** [0.128]*** [0.105]*  
Metal Goods, Engineering & Vehicles Industries -0.374 -0.485 -0.314 -1.109 
  [0.086]*** [0.120]*** [0.098]***  
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Table 5 continued:  
   Employed Vulnerable Sound t-statistic 
Other Manufacturing Industries -0.356 -0.433 -0.309 -0.800 
  [0.086]*** [0.120]*** [0.099]***  
Construction -0.208 -0.329 -0.142 -1.135 
  [0.090]** [0.128]** [0.103]  
Distribution, Hotels & Catering (Repairs) -0.254 -0.348 -0.200 -0.984 
  [0.084]*** [0.116]*** [0.097]**  
Transport & Communication -0.364 -0.472 -0.295 -1.113 
  [0.088]*** [0.123]*** [0.101]***  
Banking, Finance, Insurance & Business  -0.351 -0.463 -0.292 -1.113 
  [0.085]*** [0.119]*** [0.097]***  
Other Services -0.202 -0.236 -0.175 -0.403 
  [0.084]** [0.117]** [0.096]*  
R. of South East 0.063 0.122 0.032 1.419 
  [0.035]* [0.048]** [0.041]  
East Anglia 0.153 0.178 0.136 0.407 
  [0.058]*** [0.073]** [0.074]*  
South West 0.133 0.155 0.118 0.499 
  [0.040]*** [0.058]*** [0.047]**  
West Midlands 0.062 0.057 0.066 -0.121 
  [0.042] [0.058] [0.049]  
East Midlands 0.116 0.073 0.133 -0.779 
  [0.041]*** [0.060] [0.048]***  
Yorkshire & Humbershire 0.115 0.165 0.087 0.989 
  [0.043]*** [0.060]*** [0.050]*  
North West 0.035 0.032 0.03 0.019 
  [0.040] [0.057] [0.047]  
North 0.061 0.053 0.06 -0.074 
  [0.049] [0.067] [0.056]  
Wales 0.167 0.275 0.104 2.394** 
  [0.039]*** [0.054]*** [0.046]**  
Scotland 0.031 0.007 0.041 -0.509 
  [0.035] [0.051] [0.042]  
Wave 2 - 1992 -0.049 -0.002 -0.077 1.567 
  [0.022]** [0.039] [0.029]***  
Wave 3 - 1993 -0.131 -0.134 -0.128 -0.129 
  [0.023]*** [0.041]*** [0.030]***  
Wave 4 - 1994 -0.184 -0.176 -0.187 0.208 
  [0.024]*** [0.043]*** [0.031]***  
Wave 5 - 1995 -0.193 -0.190 -0.192 0.047 
  [0.024]*** [0.042]*** [0.031]***  
Wave 6 - 1996 -0.184 -0.185 -0.182 -0.069 
  [0.024]*** [0.043]*** [0.031]***  
Wave 7 - 1997 -0.163 -0.190 -0.149 -0.753 
  [0.024]*** [0.044]*** [0.031]***  
Wave 8 - 1998 -0.241 -0.238 -0.244 0.127 
  [0.024]*** [0.043]*** [0.030]***  
Wave 9 - 1999 -0.243 -0.257 -0.237 -0.393 
  [0.024]*** [0.042]*** [0.030]***  
Wave 10 - 2000 -0.26 -0.282 -0.249 -0.654 
  [0.024]*** [0.041]*** [0.030]***  
Wave 11 - 2001 -0.249 -0.286 -0.232 -1.031 
  [0.024]*** [0.042]*** [0.030]***  
Cut-off point 1 -3.149 [0.226]*** -3.566 [0.333]*** -2.841  [0.269]*** -1.694* 
Cut-off point 2 -2.730 [0.226]*** -3.132  [0.333]*** -2.431  [0.269]*** -1.636 
Cut-off point 3 -2.232 [0.226]*** -2.643  [0.333]*** -1.921  [0.268]*** -1.688* 
Cut-off point 4 -1.873 [0.226]*** -2.261  [0.333]*** -1.574  [0.268]*** -1.605 
Cut-off point 5 -1.208 [0.226]*** -1.619  [0.333]*** -0.892  [0.268]*** -1.699* 
Cut-off point 6  -0.129 [0.226] -0.417  [0.334] 0.503  [0.268]* -2.149** 
    
Number of Observations 50,639 15,742 34,897  
Number of Individuals 11,713 6,411 9,552  
Log Pseudo-likelihood -76,048.2 -25,557.5 -50,296.3  
Log Pseudo-likelihood at 1st iteration -78,088.0 -26,297.6 -51,338.7  
Wald x2 2,082.5*** 900.8*** 1127.1***  
 
Bootstrapped  standard errors in brackets – based on 1,000 replications - clustering on individuals 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6: Job Satisfaction Regressions with Reference Earnings - Ordered Probit Models 
Dependent Variable: Overall Job Satisfaction (Ordinal variable, scaled 1-7) 
 All Employed 
Financially 
Vulnerable 
Financially 
Sound 
t-statistic 
(Vulnerable-
Sound) 
          Intra-individual Effects     
Ln(Usual Monthly Earnings) 0.118 0.091 0.127 -0.678 
  [0.025]*** [0.043]** [0.030]***  
Ln(Reference Group Earnings) 0.232 0.349 0.174 2.150** 
  [0.038]*** [0.067]*** [0.046]***  
Ln(Normal Weekly Hours) -0.273 -0.303 -0.254 -0.504 
  [0.046]*** [0.080]*** [0.056]***  
Ln(Paid Overtime Hours) 0.029 0.034 0.022 0.705 
  [0.008]*** [0.018]* [0.014]  
Ln(No. children+1) 0.072 0.063 0.070 -0.151 
  [0.022]*** [0.038]* [0.028]**  
          Inter-individual Effects     
Mean[ln(Usual Monthly Earnings)] -0.093 -0.142 -0.076 -1.001 
  [0.031]*** [0.054]*** [0.038]**  
Mean[ln(Reference Earnings)] -0.296 -0.216 -0.331 1.315 
 [0.041]*** [0.071]*** [0.050]***  
Mean[ln(Normal Weekly Hours)] 0.318 0.110 0.419 -2.739*** 
  [0.053]*** [0.093] [0.064]***  
Mean[ln(Paid Overtime Hours)] 0.0001 0.017 -0.003 0.889 
  [0.015] [0.014] [0.010]  
Mean[ln(No. children+1)] 0.011 0.052 0.107 -1.041 
  [0.025]*** [0.042] [0.031]***  
Financially Vulnerable -0.298 - - - 
 [0.011]***    
Male -0.169 -0.256 -0.128 -4.308*** 
  [0.014]*** [0.025]*** [0.017]***  
Full-time job -0.258 -0.257 -0.245 -0.185 
  [0.030]*** [0.052]*** [0.037]***  
Age -0.035 -0.032 -0.037 0.602 
  [0.004]*** [0.007]*** [0.005]***  
Age squared/1000 0.504 0.441 0.539 -0.918 
  [0.050]*** [0.088]*** [0.060]***  
 Job Satisfaction reaches a minimum at the age of: 34.722 36.281 34.323  
Education: "Graduate degree" 0.055 0.160 0.024 1.717* 
  [0.031]* [0.072]** [0.035]  
Education: "Teaching, A-level, O-level" 0.144 0.245 0.104 3.749*** 
  [0.017]*** [0.032]*** [0.019]***  
Education: "CSE" 0.257 0.350 0.213 2.442** 
  [0.026]*** [0.046]*** [0.032]***  
Education: "None of the above" 0.332 0.428 0.291 2.761*** 
  [0.023]*** [0.041]*** [0.028]***  
Cut-off point 1 -3.189  [0.191] *** -2.883  [0.336]*** -3.224  [0.233]*** 0.835 
Cut-off point 2 -2.772  [0.191] *** -2.451  [0.336]*** -2.817  [0.232]*** 0.896 
Cut-off point 3 -2.275  [0.190] *** -1.964  [0.336]*** -2.307  [0.232]*** 0.840 
Cut-off point 4 -1.914  [0.190] *** -1.579  [0.439]*** -1.958  [0.354]*** 0.928 
Cut-off point 5 -1.247  [0.190] *** -0.934  [0.439]*** -1.275  [0.354]*** 0.834 
Cut-off point 6 0.093  [0.190] 0.271  [0.336] 0.123  [0.232] 0.362 
  
Number of Observations 49,755 15,421 34,334  
Number of Clusters 11,526 6,290 9,418  
Log Pseudo-likelihood -74,651.3 -25,011.4 -49,438.6  
Log Pseudo-likelihood at 1st iteration -76,675.7 -25,755.0 -50,473.6  
Wald x2 2,077.8*** 909.9*** 1,127.1***  
 
Bootstrapped  standard errors in brackets – based on 1,000 replications - clustering on individuals 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 7:  Examination of the cognitive impact of transitory changes in reference earnings 
 All Employed Financially Vulnerable Financially Sound 
(A) Pay includes annual increments? 
  No Yes No Yes No Yes
Log(Reference group earnings) 0.295 0.003 0.406 0.051 0.240 -0.019 
  [0.052]*** [0.057] [0.088]*** [0.108] [0.064]*** [0.068] 
Mean[Log(Reference group earnings)] -0.321 -0.254 -0.281 -0.134 -0.349 -0.305 
  [0.055]*** [0.062]*** [0.092]*** [0.114] [0.068]*** [0.074]*** 
Observations 26,598 23,157 9,022 6,399 17,576 16,758 
Log Pseudo-likelihood -41,057.20 -33,330.40 -14,948.50 -9,936.40 -25,982.20 -23,291.80 
Log Pseudo-likelihood at 1st iteration -42,318.10 -34,207.90 -15,421.60 -10,266.90 -26,614.00 -23,798.40 
(B) Older than 35 years of age? 
 No Yes No Yes No Yes
Log(Reference group earnings) 0.231 0.170 0.291 0.356 0.202 0.068 
 [0.055]*** [0.054]*** [0.097]*** [0.095]*** [0.066]*** [0.066] 
Mean[Log(Reference group earnings)] -0.187 -0.319 -0.057 -0.291 -0.248 -0.318 
 [0.059]*** [0.057]*** [0.103] [0.103]*** [0.073]*** [0.069]*** 
Observations 22,619 27,136 6,919 8,502 15,700 18,634 
Log Pseudo-likelihood -34,117.6 -40,442.3 -11,307.8 -13,661.0 -22,699.1 -26,660.9 
Log Pseudo-likelihood at 1st iteration -35,056.2 -41,570.1 -11,643.8 -14,082.6 -23,179.2 -27,264.4 
(C) Own earnings greater than reference group earnings? 
 No Yes No Yes No Yes
Log(Reference group earnings) 0.262 0.217 0.264 0.445 0.260 0.145 
 [0.058]*** [0.060]*** [0.095]*** [0.118]*** [0.074]*** [0.070]** 
Mean[Log(Reference group earnings)] -0.133 -0.434 -0.032 -0.450 -0.190 -0.427 
 [0.058]** [0.058]*** [0.095] [0.110]*** [0.073]*** [0.069]*** 
Observations 24,882 24,873 8,884 6,537 15,998 18,336 
Log Pseudo-likelihood -37,699.4 -36,847.0 -14,458.5 -10,511.4 -23,112.2 -26,230.5 
Log Pseudo-likelihood at 1st iteration -38,884.1 -37,767.1 -14,920.7 -10,828.7 -23,740.6 -26,721.4 
(D) Highly satisfied with job security? 
  No Yes No Yes No Yes
Log(Reference group earnings) 0.125 0.078 0.353 0.049 -0.025 0.094 
 [0.072]* [0.045]* [0.116]*** [0.084] [0.093] [0.054]* 
Mean[Log(Reference group earnings)] -0.248 -0.224 -0.253 -0.010 -0.227 -0.318 
 [0.079]*** [0.048]*** [0.124]** [0.088] [0.103]** [0.057]*** 
Observations 12,672 37,083 4,804 10,617 7,868 26,466 
Log Pseudo-likelihood -21,743.8 -49,947.6 -85,36.2 -15,475.4 -13,146.2 -34,332.2 
Log Pseudo-likelihood at 1st iteration -22,295.0 -51,378.4 -87,48.4 -16,008.8 -13,439.0 -35,161.7 
(E) Is there someone out of the household you can borrow money from? 
  No Yes No Yes No Yes
Log(Reference group earnings) 0.237 0.247 0.397 0.197 0.173 0.270 
  [0.096]** [0.057]*** [0.169]** [0.109]* [0.117] [0.067]*** 
Mean[Log(Reference group earnings)] -0.350 -0.269 -0.376 -0.142 -0.370 -0.327 
  [0.101]*** [0.061]*** [0.179]** [0.116] [0.123]*** [0.072]*** 
Observations 8,296 22,745 2,763 6,047 5,533 16,698 
Log Pseudo-likelihood -12,549.9 -32,702.8 -4,487.0 -9,445.5 -8,019.7 -23,176.5 
Log Pseudo-likelihood at 1st iteration -12,915.8 -33,547.1 -4,618.7 -9,725.1 -8,189.6 -23,629.1 
(F) Do you have anyone who can help in a time of crisis (more than one person)? 
  No Yes No Yes No Yes
Log(Reference group earnings) 0.189 0.256 0.332 0.355 0.116 0.210 
  [0.061]*** [0.049]*** [0.108]*** [0.087]*** [0.075] [0.059]*** 
Mean[Log(Reference group earnings)] -0.415 -0.235 -0.248 -0.214 -0.493 -0.244 
  [0.067]*** [0.052]*** [0.116]** [0.092]** [0.082]*** [0.063]*** 
Observations 18,785 30,970 5,776 9,645 13,009 21,325 
Log Pseudo-likelihood -28,297.9 -46,211.1 -9,316.48 -15,630.6 -18,876.6 -30,451.2 
Log Pseudo-likelihood at 1st iteration -29,188.0 -47,394.1 -9,674.83 -16,045.8 -19,370.9 -31,037.1 
 
Notes:  
*: significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Bootstrapped  standard errors in brackets – based on 1,000 replications - clustering on individuals 
The rest of the specification is similar to that in Table 6.  
Responses in panel (E) are given after wave 6 
